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The "Further Response" filed by plaintiffs demonstrates 
the lack of foundation for plaintiffs1 motion seeking the right to 
file this "Further Response." It remains that defendants1 Reply 
Brief properly responded to matters presented by plaintiffs and 
did not impermissibly present new matter. This new document of 
plaintiffs1 is simply plaintiffs1 effort to patch up the weakness 
in its Reply Brief. 
No good purpose can be served by responding to the 
attacks in pages 1 and 2. This is but a repeat of the approach 
taken in plaintiffs' Reply Brief. The point stands that 
plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts is not a Statement of Facts, but is 
an argument laced with improprieties. The plaintiff need not 
refer to counsel by name to direct attacks to him. Here, the lack 
of civility is repeated by assertions of "irresponsible," 
"misleading" of the Court. But, let us not dwell on this, but 
look to the merits. These matters are adequately covered in 
defendants' Reply Brief and the problem their presented will be 
left to the Court's good judgment upon review of the respective 
briefs and the supporting record. 
Plaintiffs' obvious concern about the application of the 
statute of limitations is well justified. Plaintiffs should be 
concerned. The statute of limitations is a substantial bar to 
this action. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, it is not 
contended by defendants that the discovery rule does not apply to 
fraud actions, but it is contended the discovery rule does not 
aPPly to this fraud action. It is fundamental that, even in a 
fraud case, plaintiffs cannot stick their heads in the sand and 
ignore the business realities that surround them. As explained in 
one of the cases cited by plaintiffs themselves, "The discovery 
rule functions as an exception to the normal application of a 
statute of limitation" and it begins to run not only when 
plaintiffs learn of the claim, but also when plaintiffs "in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts 
which give rise to the cause of action." Klinaer v. Knightly, 791 
P.2d 868 at 869 (Utah 1990). 
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Plaintiffs are the ones who gave the court below various 
findings to get around the statute of limitations (Findings 46-
48), but they here seem puzzled that those findings are 
challenged. 
Here# as explained in defendants1 Opening Brief (pages 
40-41), plaintiffs exercised no diligence whatever. Further, the 
discovery rule should not be left to blind application and there 
should be some exceptional circumstances in the case or some acts 
of concealment by the defendant to warrant its application. In 
spite of the rehabilitative efforts in plaintiffs1 "Further 
Response," it remains that the discovery rule should not be 
applied in this particular case. The deposition testimony relied 
upon by plaintiffs (p. 3) did not "contradict" the trial 
testimony, but, rather, it was the other way around. The trial 
testimony, taken in full context with the prior deposition 
testimony, simply harmonizes what was said and demonstrates that 
there is no clear or convincing evidence to support plaintiffs' 
attempt to avoid the application of the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs, here again, rely on the trial court's finding without 
adequately considering the fundamental issue, whether there is 
adequate support for the finding. But, the discovery rule is a 
question of law and not a question of fact, in any event. This 
Court, therefore, "need show no deference to the trial court's 
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ruling on appeal" and "should review it for correctness." 
Klincrer, supra. at 870. The supposed acts of concealment 
attributed by plaintiffs (p.3) to the defendants are tenuous at 
best. It was plaintiffs1 superintendent who concealed things, not 
the defendants. 
Discussion with respect to what was said and what was not 
said to Mr. Elkington when he examined the records on New Year's 
Eve will have to depend on the Court's interpretation of the 
record. Plaintiffs advance an unduly harsh and strict 
interpretation. Any fair-minded person, including Mr. Elkington 
if he were fair minded, would have quite clearly known that he had 
not been "refused" the records, and that it was a matter of the 
"storage room situation and the location of those records [which] 
were unknown" to Hurst and that "at that time of day and under 
those circumstances, that I couldn't produce them and also that I 
hadn't been released by Mr. Heaton to do so." (R.454, at 97.) 
Plaintiffs always place a convenient "twist" on the 
testimony. For example, in plaintiffs' footnote 2 at page 5 
plaintiffs assert that Mr. Hurst testified he was not sure whether 
there were earlier transactions. What Mr. Hurst said was: "Well, 
after he finished with looking at 85 and making his summary of 
that information, he asked me if there were transactions earlier 
than that and I told him that I believed there could have been. 
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That I wasn't sure when my dealings with Heaton had started." 
(R.454, at 97 and 156.) The reference in footnote 2 to testimony 
that Elkington had not asked to see "pre-1985 records" was earlier 
deposition testimony and responded to the narrow question whether 
Elkington "asked to see 1984". In the next line it is clarified, 
"I don't recall if there was any conversation about anything 
beyond '85." (R.454, at 156.) In that same deposition, Mr. Hurst 
affirmed that 1983 and 1984 records did exist. (R.454, at 156.) 
Elkington claims that he asked simply "for any earlier 
information" and he claims he was told, "such information was no 
longer available." (R.452, at 134.) The fact remains, however, 
that Elkington, a well-trained and experienced certified public 
accountant, made no further effort whatever beyond this New Year's 
Eve visit. It is submitted that this casual testimony and the 
admitted lack of any further request or any further follow-up by 
the accountant, Mr. Elkington, is less than clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Defendants' footnote 4 on page 13 is, indeed, a "careful 
effort." Plaintiffs' complaint about this effort (p.5) is 
straining at gnats and misses the point. The point is that 
although Mr. Heaton did say he could "not remember the exact time 
when it was," he did affirm "but it was before or at the time" the 
settlement agreement was entered into. (R.451, at 123-124.) It 
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is significant that after the recess, this key witness spent two 
pages of testimony waffling all over the place, and yet the best 
he could come up with is that he could not remember, because this 
was "three years ago," further demonstrating the importance of the 
statute of limitations in this case. 
With respect to when the statements about "not telling" 
Steelco came up, it is again submitted that a fair reading of Mr. 
Heaton's testimony shows that even Heaton's explanation places the 
supposed statements in the context of the sales of the Southyard 
material. That is why several pages of the transcript are cited. 
A reading of this entire portion of testimony (R.451 at 7 through 
19) will demonstrate this to be the case. Treatment of this 
testimony at pages 18-20 of defendants1 Reply Brief is quite 
appropriate and it remains that this point of plaintiffs1 case is 
far from clear and convincing. 
With respect to plaintiffs' comments at page 8 of its 
"Further Response," it is emphasized that it is not established 
that defendants ever "refused" to make information available to 
plaintiffs. It must be remembered that the request for 
information came after Heaton had come in and said he was being 
"investigated"; even then, there was no refusal, but simply a 
request, quite natural in the face of Heaton's revelation of an 
investigation of his own improper conduct, that counsel should be 
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consulted. Plaintiffs repeat here again for the third time in 
this brief the disagreements about availability of records prior 
to 1985. That has been discussed above. Plaintiffs' persistence 
in its description of "hand picking" of records only demonstrates 
the strain in plaintiffs' case. The 1986 and 1987 records had 
been located and were available to Mr. Elkington before he arrived 
as a courtesy to him because those were the records requested and 
the specific ones identified in Heaton's written authorization 
(Ex. 48-D; R.454 at 92; see defendants' Opening Brief, at 21-22.) 
Plaintiffs' "evidence" of a supposed agreement between 
Hurst and Heaton to confirm a phony amount of purchases centers on 
plaintiffs' assertion (page 9 of "Further Response") that "Heaton 
asked Hurst not to reveal all of his dealings with Heaton". It 
is true and undisputed that Heaton did make such a request. But 
plaintiffs overlook the further very emphatic testimony of Mr. 
Hurst that when Heaton asked him to withhold all of the 
transactions, "I told him in no way would I participate in any 
kind of a coverup. I told him if, in fact, he hadn't been square 
with his employer, that was his problem now and I wouldn't be 
involved and I didn't want any part of being involved in an 
attempt to withhold any information." (R.454, at 89.) 
The situation with respect to the commissions is amply 
covered in our prior briefs. Defendants did not ignore any 
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evidence in the course of discussions on these commissions in the 
prior brief and amply explained that evidence. Plaintiffs here 
present a new argument, that Mr. Hurst responded wrongly to Mr. 
Elkington that no one else was involved. Plaintiffs here utilize 
their customary non-sequitur that Chris Williams was involved. As 
pointed out in defendants1 earlier briefs, there is absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever of Chris Williams' involvement other than her 
own uncorroborated testimony about being paid a commission and the 
assertion that she accompanied Heaton on a delivery of scrap 
steel. That does not place her in a situation where it was a 
sinister concealment for Mr. Hurst not to have mentioned her to 
Elkington on this occasion. 
The matter of the stolen records is amply covered in 
defendants1 Reply Brief (pp.31-32). Plaintiffs now further 
compound their overreaching approach by lumping together the bank 
statements used by defendants at trial in the same category as the 
cash receipts and disbursements journal inquired about in the 
earlier deposition. This Court's review of the record will show 
that this is, indeed, a side show. The one point not raised in 
plaintiffs' earlier brief is the new reference to their Request 
for Production of Documents. Plaintiffs seem to be saying that 
Exhibit 53-D and the related testimony should not have been 
admitted in evidence, but that is an evidentiary question not 
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asserted as a point on this appeal and should not be considered 
here. 
The remaining matter in plaintiffs1 "Further Response" 
was already covered in plaintiffs1 earlier brief and this is but 
a rehash of arguments there made. Defendants Reply Brief amply 
responds to these other matters. The Court will not be burdened 
with further discussion here. 
For the reasons shown in defendants' Opening Brief and 
Reply Brief, the judgment should be reversed and the case should 
be dismissed. 
DATED this ^ 0 day otp^U^u JL992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
L. R.*Gardiner, Jr. \ 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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